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COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO V. LEWIS: A
"CONSCIENCE-SHOCKING" DECISION
REGARDING OFFICER LIABILITY IN HIGH-
SPEED POLICE PURSUITS
We recognize that courts should be hesitant to second-guess
government officials when they must make swift decisions regarding
public safety. But even swift decisions, if arbitrary, may violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The television is on as you get ready to go out for the night. In
the middle of your program, the local newscaster announces that he
or she is bringing you a "Special Report" with live coverage of a po-
lice chase in progress. You have observed this scene many times be-
fore: the news helicopter flies overhead with cameras aimed at the
chaos down below. The black-and-white patrol car, with flashing
lights and blaring sirens, follows closely behind a reckless driver
who arbitrarily weaves in and out of traffic at frequently obscene
speeds-sometimes up to 100 miles per hour-in residential neigh-
borhoods.
The ending is likewise all too familiar: the fleeing suspect en-
ters an intersection on a red light, with the patrol car pursuing, and
the suspect's car then broadsides the vehicle having the right-of-way;
or the suspect loses control and careens into a group of innocent pe-
destrians; or the officer rams into the fleeing car, killing those inside.
Whatever the specific circumstances, when all is said and done,
someone is lying dead-and the state has had a hand in the fatal out-
come.
1. Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998). For clarification, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision will be referred to as Lewis I, while the United States Supreme Court
decision will be referred to as Lewis H.
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Do individuals who have been injured or killed by an officer en-
gaged in a high-speed pursuit have any sort of federal constitutional
claim against the officer? According to the United States Supreme
Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,2 the answer to this question
is "no." Rather, the Court held that "only a purpose to cause harm
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of
arbitrary conduct shocking the conscience, necessary for a due proc-
ess violation."3 In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that
"when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's instant judg-
ment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to
harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates 'the large con-
cerns of the governors and the governed.
' '4
Justice Souter rejected the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the culpa-
bility standard for the officer's conduct is one of "deliberate indiffer-
ence.., or reckless disregard," 5 and instead held that "high-speed
chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their
legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment.",6 This decision primarily rested on concern that an
"expansive reading of § 1983 and the Due Process Clause would
make the Fourteenth Amendment 'a font of tort law to be superim-
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States."'7
This Note critically examines the Supreme Court's decision de-
fining the standard for officer conduct in high-speed police pursuits
as that of "shocks the conscience." Part II recounts a history of sub-
stantive due process claims and officer liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Part III provides a factual background for the landmark Lewis
II case and sets forth the basis for the decision. Part IV analyzes the
Court's decision in light of the two standards of culpability available
to the Court, along with overriding public policy concerns. Part V
2. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
3. Id. at 1711-12 (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 1720 (citation omitted).
5. Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 441.
6. Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1720 (emphasis added).
7. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1310 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1985)); see Lewis 1, 118 S. Ct. at
1718.
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concludes that the shocks the conscience standard gives officers lim-
itless authority to endanger innocent bystanders without providing a
satisfactory means of recourse. It further contends that a return to
the well-known "deliberate indifference or reckless disregard" stan-
dard would continue to provide adequate protection to officers mak-
ing split-second decisions, while still allowing those who are arbi-
trarily injured by state action to have some form of valuable
recourse.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Substantive Due Process
What then is due process of law? It is nothing tangible or
concrete or specific. It is an 'idea' or 'concept,' a legal fic-
tion, if you please, which is the Court's most potent weapon
'in its exercise of judicial review .... In the minds of the
justices the term 'due process' has somehow become an all-
inclusive phrase comprehending notions of reasonableness
and fairness. It has come to comprise the elements of social
justice and liberty-liberty to do and have those things
which the justices deem essential to the kind of society they
wish to preserve or promote.
8
Prior to the Civil War, as society became more complex and
chaotic, legal scholars and social leaders realized that a balance
needed to be struck between an individual's pursuit of happiness and
the government's responsibility to maintain order and promote the
general welfare.9 Notions of due process were first derived from
Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, 10 wherein the King of England
promised that "[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised,
outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers
8. VIRGINIA L. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 417 (Kennikat Press 1972)
(1951).
9. See EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY 31 (1996).
10. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM
AND THE COURT 94 (7th ed. 1998) (providing a general definition of due proc-
ess of law and the genesis of the concept).
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and by the law of the land."" Based on this legal tradition, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to develop broad con-
cepts of fundamental rights that would obligate the government to
protect "three core values: life, liberty, and property."' 12 However,
complete understanding of what due process encompasses continues
to be far from clear. In 1952, the Supreme Court explained that
"[d]ue process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of re-
spect for those personal immunities which... are 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental'
or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."",13 Originally, con-
cepts of due process primarily involved procedure.' 4 Only later did
11. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39.
12. KEYNES, supra note 9, at 10. The Fourteenth Amendment, first intro-
duced by John Bingham on January 12, 1866, guarantees that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see KEYNES, supra note 9, at 63 (referencing
Bingham's proposed amendment to the Constitution that eventually became
the core of section one). The ratification and enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment attempted to forever secure the rights first recognized in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 10, at 32. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 sought to override the "Black Codes," which were enacted
in the South as a way of keeping blacks in servitude. See KEYNES, supra note
9, at 49. Republicans feared that once the Democrats obtained control of Con-
gress, they would repeal the Civil Rights Act, thereby rendering an individual's
fundamental rights both vulnerable and unprotected. See id. at 69-74. The
only way to avoid this result was through an amendment to the Constitution.
13. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (citations omitted). In
Rochin, police officers pumped the defendant's stomach in order to retrieve
evidence of defendant's drug possession. The officers then admitted the evi-
dence in order to convict the defendant. See id. at 166. The Court found that
the officers' conduct violated the defendant's constitutional rights pursuant to
the Due Process Clause. See id. at 174. In writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter concluded "that the proceedings by which this conviction was ob-
tained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private senti-
mentalism about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience." Id. at 172.
14. See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 10, at 103. "Indeed, due process
of law.., was originally... interpreted as a procedural restriction upon gov-
ernment. It concerned itself, more or less, not with what government was do-
ing but how it was doing it." Id. These procedural due process protections
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the Court begin to recognize that due process also provided a sub-
stantive guarantee against arbitrary governmental deprivation of fun-
damental rights. 15 In the course of exploring this philosophy, the
Court initially struck down many laws that interfered with property
and economic liberties. 16 This period became known as the Lochner
Era' 7 -a time when the Court invalidated many laws on the basis
that they unduly and arbitrarily interfered with these liberties.'" This
approach to individual rights continued into the late 1930s; thereaf-
ter, the Court began giving greater deference to the legislature and
started upholding laws that under Lochner would have been invali-
dated."'
The Court's shift was in large part due to the devastating effects
of the Great Depression: fifteen million workers soon became un-
20employed. Consequently, both individuals and states looked to the
federal government for relief.21 The Court's staunch protection of
property and economic liberties flew directly in the face of President
were most often recognized in criminal cases, where the courts interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment as protecting an accused person's right to be heard by
a regularly constituted tribunal of the state, right to counsel, right against self-
incrimination, and right to ajury trial. See id. at 103-05.
15. See id. at 95-96.
16. See id. at 8-9.
17. This era was named after the landmark case of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). There, the Court struck down a New York law designed
to protect the health of bakers by limiting their employment hours to 10 hours
per day or 60 hours per week. The Court reasoned that the law violated the
Due Process Clause because it constituted "an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of... individual[s]" to enter into their own
contracts. Id. at 56.
18. See KEYNES, supra note 9, at 118-19.
19. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), embodies the first example
of this change. In Nebbia, the Court upheld a law designed to aid farmers by
setting a minimum sale price for milk. The Court warned that laws should not
be invalidated unless they are "palpably in excess of legislative power." Id. at
538. Shortly thereafter, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), the Court upheld a law regulating minimum wages for women and
children. An individual's liberty to contract proved critical to the decision.
Although the right to contract was clearly a protected right, the Court found
that it was not a fundamental right, and, therefore, did not require special judi-
cial protection. See id. at 391-92.
20. See KEYNES, supra note 9, at 129.
21. See id.
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Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal relief and reform policies.22 Either
the President or the Court had to yield.23 In the end, the Court relin-
quished its heightened protection of economic rights, and allowed the
emerging welfare state to flourish. Nonetheless, it continued to use
Lochner-based reasoning to articulate the need for governmental
protection over such unenumerated rights24 as family,25 marital,26 and
22. See id. at 130. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatiza-
tion of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1438 (1988) (noting that the
New Deal attack on Lochner-era jurisprudence was a reaction by those who
believed that judicial supervision of administration regulation was, to a large
degree, anachronistic).
23. Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), forecasted the Court's abandonment of economic liberty pro-
tection to Congress and state legislatures when the Court upheld a congres-
sional law barring filled milk from the marketplace. In the infamous footnote
number four, Justice Stone clearly indicated that he was "unwilling to extend
the principle of presumptive validity to state and federal policies encroaching
on other personal liberties." KEYNES, supra note 9, at 134. Stone contended
that "concepts of preferred rights that... [were] indispensable to ordered lib-
erty" and, therefore, laws which impinged on those rights were "inherently
suspect and presumptively invalid." Id. at 134-35.
24. Unenumerated rights are those not explicitly provided for in the Con-
stitution. The Court first defined unenumerated rights as being protected by
the Due Process Clause in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and again
two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Meyer,
the Court struck down a Nebraska law that criminalized teaching of German
and other languages by reasoning that parents have a protected right in allow-
ing their children to learn foreign languages. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-403.
In Pierce, the Court struck down an Oregon law that forced parents to enroll
their children in public rather than private schools. There, the Court reasoned
that the law "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents... [in try-
ing] to direct the upbringing and education of [their] children." Pierce, 268
U.S. at 534-35.
Despite the demise of substantive due process starting in the early 1930s,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), later revived the Court's pro-
tection of personal unenumerated rights. There the Court found that a funda-
mental "right of privacy" existed under the "penumbras and emanations" of
several fundamental constitutional guarantees. See id. at 484-86. The dissent
argued that the Court cannot create protected rights however it sees fit; rather,
the Court's interpretations should limit themselves to a strict and literal reading
of the text. See id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a law
prohibiting the marriage of individuals who failed to comply with court-
ordered child support arrangements); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a law inhibiting a grandmother's ability to live
with her two grandsons in the same house and still receive the same benefits).
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reproductive 27 privacy, and the right to choose or refuse medical
treatment.
28
Over the years, society has recognized certain specific rights as
being fundamental. One of the most staunchly protected fundamen-
tal rights involves an individual's right to be free from arbitrary gov-
ernment action.29 However, in determining what type of action is
"fatally arbitrary" the courts distinguish between claims that involve
legislative enactments and those that involve the conduct of a spe-
cific government official. 30  Laws that infringe on a fundamental
right typically receive a strict standard of review, requiring the state
to prove that the law is narrowly tailored to address a compelling
state interest.31 The result of invoking such a stringent standard of
review is that most of the laws challenged are ultimately struck
down. It is a rare case for a state law to survive strict scrutiny.
Conversely, when executive action-action by a government of-
ficial-is challenged, courts have historically used a shocks the con-
science standard of culpability in determining whether the official's
conduct reaches the level of being constitutionally reprehensible.
32
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a law pro-
hibiting interracial marriages).
27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the protected
right of personal privacy, first established in Griswold, includes a woman's
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that a requirement that a married woman
notify her husband prior to obtaining an abortion is unconstitutional).
28. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(finding that a competent person has a fundamental right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, but holding that the patient here had no such right be-
cause she was incompetent to make such a decision and did not have a "living
will"); Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
(holding that a law prohibiting use of the drug Laetrile violated a cancer pa-
tient's fundamental right of privacy), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
29. Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1716.
30. See id.
31. See Rosalie B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16
U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 314 (1991).
32. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (holding that the
shooting of a prisoner during the ending of a prison-hostage situation did not
shock the conscience); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (overturning
a conviction where the pumping of a defendant's stomach in order to obtain
evidence shocked the conscience).
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The shocks the conscience test, however, has not been applied with-
out confusion.
In 1973, Second Circuit Judge Friendly attempted to clarify the
meaning of this test in Johnson v. Glick.33 Judge Friendly asserted
that in determining "whether the constitutional line has been
crossed" by a particular use of force,
[a] court must look to such factors as the need for the appli-
cation of force, the relationship for the need and the amount
of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether [the] force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm.
34
These guidelines were cited with approval in Whitley v. Albers35 and
Graham v. Connor.36 Moreover, a myriad of other courts have also
looked to the Glick factors for direction in analyzing substantive due
process claims.37 Nonetheless, despite this apparent following,
courts continued to have trouble in coming to formulated conclusions
regarding what type of conduct shocks the conscience.
38
B. Section 1983: Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights
Individuals can recover for due process violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 39 which provides a cause of action against persons
acting under color of state who deprive an individual of a constitu-
tionally protected right to life, liberty or property.
33. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
34. Id. at 1033.
35. 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
36. 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1993); Gilmere
v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Alford, 647 F. Supp. 1386 (M.D. Ala. 1986);
Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
38. See Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase: Determining
Substantive Due Process Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits
When an Innocent Bystander is Injured, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 208 n.234
(1995).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 specifically states that "[e]very
person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen... to the deprivation of any ights... secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured." Id.
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Generally, for plaintiffs to prevail on a § 1983 claim, they must
show that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a per-
son acting under color of state law, and (2) this conduct constituted a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immu-
nity.
40
Section 1983 was intended to compensate individuals for their
injuries, vindicate constitutional rights, and deter future constitu-
tional violations.4 ' In particular, the Court's early opinions in § 1983
actions seemed to suggest the most important goal was that of deter-
rence.42 Deterrence was in large part effectuated through damage
awards and injunctions.43 More recently, though, this goal seems to
be secondary at best.44 Indeed, the history of the Court's enforce-
ment of § 1983 claims indicates that the goal of compensation is now
most important.45 Nonetheless, the Court's development of immuni-
ties, strict causation requirements, and bars against governmental en-
tity vicarious liability has "ensure[d] that § 1983 will not even be an
effective compensatory device."46 Rather, the Court's concern with
federalism issues,47 government official timidity,48 and overcrowded
court dockets, 49 makes it more unlikely than ever that injunctions and
damages will be granted in such cases.
It is important to note that § 1983 does not provide its own sub-
stantive right as "it serve[s] only to ensure that an individual ha[s] a
cause of action for violations of the Constitution."50 This means,
40. See Edlund, supra note 38, at 162-63.
41. See Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Spe-
cial Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 77 (1989).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 77-78.
47. One way that the Court justifies the strict limitations on § 1983's effec-
tiveness is by arguing that such limitations "avoid[] needless friction between
federal courts and state governments." Id. at 79.
48. "The Court continually asserts that local officials could not function if
they were under a constant threat of liability, or even the threat of having to
defend a suit." Id. at 83.
49. "[T]he desire to eliminate frivolous cases has moved members of the
Court to advocate for strict limits on punitive damages and to expand the reach
of the immunities." Id. at 84.
50. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
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then, that constitutional deprivations only exist for those rights al-
ready recognized by the Court. Therefore, it is hard for individuals
to state a claim under § 1983 where the Court has not yet analyzed
the alleged conduct.
In reality, it is very difficult for individuals to succeed on § 1983
claims. This difficulty is likely a consequence of the apparent hos-
tility the Supreme Court harbors towards these claims.51 This hostil-
ity is often covered by general policy arguments weighing the gov-
ernment's interest in controlling crime and chaos against the
individual's interest in being free from arbitrary action. 52 In applica-
tion, the Court favors the government's interest in controlling crime
over individual rights.
In addition to the Court's resistance to maintaining the deterrent
effect § 1983 was designed to promote, there also seems to be a so-
cietal shift that advocates for more aggressive law enforcement, re-
gardless 0f the costs.53 In the quest to bring control over crime, soci-
ety seems to have lost sight of the individual rights our forefathers
knew were essential to an acceptable standard of living.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the com-
peting interests of crime control and individual rights in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis.5 4 In particular, the Court addressed what the
degree of culpability should be for police officers engaged in high-
speed pursuits that result in injury, and oftentimes death, to both sus-
pects and bystanders.
5 5
51. See Beermann, supra note 41, at 76.
52. See id. ("The Court cloaks its hostility with the standard policy argu-
ments... purport[ing] to weigh the value of greater enforcement against the
consequences for government that such enforcement entails.").
53. See Mark R. Brown, Accountability in Government and Section 1983,
25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 53 (1991). "Our modem ethos appears to expect
little from public servants while tolerating much disservice. This attitude then
reinforces the morality, apparently now shared by government officials, that
responsibility only follows deliberate wrongdoing. Anything less, whether an
indifferent failure or careless act, is acceptable." Id. at 58.
54. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
55. Id. at 1708.
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III. CASE BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On May 22, 1990, at about 8:30 p.m., Sacramento County Offi-
cers James Everett Smith and Murray Stapp responded to a call to
break up a fight.56 As the officers prepared to leave, Stapp saw a
motorcycle approaching at a high speed.57 The motorcycle was be-
ing operated by 18-year-old Brian Willard, with 16-year-old Philip
Lewis as a passenger.58 Officer Stapp turned on his overhead lights,
yelled at the boys to stop, and then tried to pen in the motorcycle by
using the two patrol cars as boundaries.5 Ignoring the officer's
commands, Willard maneuvered his way between the two cars and
sped off.
60
Officer Smith then put on his emergency overhead lights and si-
rens, and a high-speed pursuit ensued. The chase lasted approxi-
mately seventy-five seconds, covered 1.3 miles of a residential
neighborhood, and reached maximum speeds of 100 miles per hour
in thirty-mile-per-hour zones. 62 The motorcycle wove in and out of
oncoming traffic, causing a few vehicles to swerve off the road.63
The chase ended when the boys reached the top of a crest, tried
to make a hard left turn, tipped over, and then skidded to a halt.64 As
Officer Smith came to the same crest and saw the motorcycle, he
slammed on his brakes but was unable to stop in time. Conse-
quently, he skidded into Lewis, projecting him seventy feet down the
road.65 Lewis suffered massive injuries and was subsequently pro-
nounced dead at the scene.
66
Philip Lewis's parents filed suit against Sacramento County, the
Sacramento County Sheriffs Department, and Officer Smith under
56. See id. at 1712.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right to life.67
B. District Court
In the district court, Judge Burrell granted summary judgment in
favor of all defendants.68 With regard to the claim against Officer
Smith, the district court ruled that regardless of any constitutional
violation, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.69 The court
found that the law supporting a Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to life and personal security in the context of high-speed police
pursuits was unclear and not well-established.70
For the claim against the county and sheriffs department, there
were facts indicating "that the training procedures were 'not so in-
herently inadequate' that . . . [they] could be held liable under §
1983." 71 Specifically, the district court found that because the sher-
iffs department pursuit policy exceeded California's statutory stan-
dards and set clear guidelines for when a pursuit was appropriate, the
policy was not "deliberately indifferent to Lewis's constitutional
rights. 72
After the district court dismissed all of the claims against the of-
ficer and the county, the Lewises appealed. 73
C. Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
Writing for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Pregerson affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Sacramento County and the Sacramento County Sheriffs
Department.74  Judge Pregerson, however, reversed the district
67. See id.
68. See Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 437.
69. See id. The defense of qualified immunity assures all government offi-
cials that they will not be held liable for their conduct except where they vio-
late a clearly established right and the officer could not have reasonably be-
lieved his conduct was lawful. See Peter H. Doherty, Qualified Immunity in
Police Use of Force Claims, COLO. LAW., May 1993, at 983, 984.
70. See Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 437.
71. Id. at 437.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 436.
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court's ruling as to Officer Smith's liability, stating that "when a law
enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and
personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, con-
stitutional due process rights may be implicated., 7 5 The court further
stated that the appropriate standard for officers engaged in high-
speed police pursuits is whether they acted with "deliberate indiffer-
ence to, or reckless disregard for, a person's right to life and personal
security.5
76
In coming to this conclusion, the court stated that although the
standard of conduct to be applied in the context of police pursuits
had not specifically been addressed by the Ninth Circuit, numerous
other substantive due process cases decided by the court shed signifi-
cant light in this area.77 The court noted that none of the federal cir-
cuit courts have required that intentional misconduct be shown to as-
sert a § 1983 action.78  Similarly, no circuit has found mere
negligence sufficient for a due process violation.
79
75. Id. at 439.
76. Id. at 441. In setting the minimum standard of conduct as deliberate in-
difference or reckless disregard, the court was clear to point out that this stan-
dard is limited to the context of high-speed police pursuits, and did not assert
that this should be the standard for all substantive due process claims. See id.
77. See id. at 439. See also Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir.
1995) (applying deliberate indifference standard where an officer ordered a
passenger and an intoxicated driver to get back in their car and leave the area
and the passenger was subsequently killed in an accident); Swofford v. Man-
drell, 969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard standard where sheriff did not rescue pre-trial detainee when
sheriff heard detainee's screams resulting from attack and sexual assault by
other inmates); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir.
1988) (applying deliberate indifference or reckless disregard standard where
officer's search and supervision of detainee failed to reveal concealed gun with
which the detainee subsequently committed suicide), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1065 (1989); Morales v. New York State Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30
(2d Cir. 1988) (applying deliberate indifference standard where inmate made
officer aware of threats by other inmate but officer failed to take action, re-
sulting in attack on inmate by other inmate); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,
797 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (applying deliberate indifference standard where state and
county officials placed child in foster home where child was subsequently
abused by foster parents), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
78. See Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 439 n.5.
79. See id.
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As part of their claim, the Lewises alleged that the officer's
conduct was in violation of the Sacramento County Sheriff's De-
partment General Order, which provides guidelines for all relevant
police procedures.80 With respect to high-speed police pursuits, Sac-
ramento's General Order requires that the police officer consider
whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit in light of un-
reasonable hazards to life and property, and demands that a pursuit
be discontinued if those hazards outweigh the benefit of apprehen-
sion. 81 Considering these mandates, the court found that the pursuit
clearly presented unreasonable risks to both the boys on the motor-
cycle and to innocent bystanders.8 2 In light of the original infrac-
tion-failing to stop on an officer's command-the court did not find
that the need for apprehension outweighed the risks presented and
felt that the officers should have discontinued the pursuit.83
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Officer Smith
was not entitled to qualified immunity.8 4 The court stated that al-
though there was minimal and unclear case law regarding the spe-
cific acts of police officers engaged in high-speed pursuits, other
"[c]ases involving law enforcement officers' excessive use of force
in the context of unconstitutional seizures were sufficiently analo-
gous to put Smith on notice that . . . he could be liable under §
1983. "85 The court cited Tennessee v. Garner6 for the proposition
that use of deadly force is unconstitutional if used to prevent the es-
cape of an apparently non-dangerous felon,87 and concluded that
Garner "put Officer Smith on notice that he could not constitution-
ally stop Lewis with deadly force."
88
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined that the officer's disre-
gard of the General Order amounted to a genuine issue of material
80. See id. at 441-42. The court stated that such a violation was relevant to
deciding whether a due process violation had occurred. See id. at 442.
81. See id.
82. See id. "The enormity of the danger to Lewis and Willard and to the
general public was readily apparent." Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 445.
85. Id. at 443.
86. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
87. See id. at ll.
88. Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 443.
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fact, and accordingly, reversed summary judgment in favor of Offi-
cer Smith and remanded the case for trial on that issue.8
9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari90 based on a deep circuit
court split9 ' regarding the appropriate standard for judging the offi-
cer's conduct, and subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
92
D. United States Supreme Court
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court,93 concluded that
89. See id. at 445.
90. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 520 U.S. 1250 (1997) (granting
certiorari).
91. Compare Lewis I, 98 F.3d at 441 ("deliberate indifference" or "reckless
disregard"); Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 1995) (same);
Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); McKinney v. Pate, 20
F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); with Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038
(1st Cir. 1996) ("shocks the conscience"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1210 (1997);
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306-07 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(same); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir.
1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d
534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Williams v. Denver, 99 F.3d 1009, 1014-15
(10th Cir. 1996) (same).
The Eighth and Second Circuits had yet to definitively determine the
standard to be applied to cases involving high-speed police pursuits. None-
theless, other decisions within those two Circuits indicated a likelihood that
they would employ a shocks the conscience standard to analyze such cases.
See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989)
(finding that where an officer's conduct in a high-speed pursuit did not exem-
plify gross negligence, it "most certainly [did] not rise to the level of conduct
which would sustain a claim under section 1983"); Kaluczky v. City of White
Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that in a harassment case
against the city, "[s]ubstantive due process protects against government action
that is arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense");
Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding in a § 1983 ac-
tion brought by a former inmate against prison officials, that excessive force
claims would constitute "a deprivation of due process where the government
official's conduct 'shock[ed] the conscience') (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
92. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1721.
93. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor), and Justice Breyer each filed separate
concurrences. Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia-joined by Justice Thomas-
filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment.
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"[riegardless [of] whether [Officer] Smith's behavior offended the
reasonableness held up by tort law or the balance struck in law en-
forcement's own codes of sound practice, it does not shock the con-
science, and [Officer Smith and Sacramento County] are not called
upon to answer for it under § 1983."94
In coming to this conclusion, the Court first sought to define the
fundamental right alleged to have been violated.95 The Court re-
jected the county's argument that police pursuits are really an offi-
cer's attempt to make a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and
should, therefore, only be analyzed under Fourth Amendment stan-
dards.96 Looking to California v. Hodari D.,97 the Court reiterated
that police pursuit of a fleeing suspect does not amount to a Fourth
Amendment seizure.98 The Court explained that a governmentally
caused termination of an individual's freedom constitutes a seizure
only when the government intends such a result.99 Where an officer
intends to stop a suspect by show of authority-via sirens, flashing
lights and continued pursuit-but then stops the suspect by acciden-
tally crashing into him, no seizure has occurredl °° Consequently,
despite the more-specific-provision rule, 1 1 the Court found the
94. Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1721.
95. See id. at 1714 n.5.
96. See id. at 1715. A Fourth Amendment analysis requires the application
of a reasonableness standard to the officer's conduct, instead of a substantive
due process analysis used to determine the presence of constitutionally prohib-
ited arbitrary governmental action. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989).
97. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
98. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1715.
The word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands
or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is
ultimately unsuccessful .... It does not remotely apply, however, to
the prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a
fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.
Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626.
99. See Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1715 (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 596-97 (1991)).
100. See id. (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1991)).
101. See id. (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)).
The more-specific-provision rule requires that a constitutional claim covered
by a specific provision of the Constitution must be analyzed under the standard
applicable to that provision rather than under general notions of substantive
due process. See id.
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Fourth Amendment inapplicable to the Lewises' claim and instead
affirmed their right to bring their claim under the Due Process
Clause.
102
The Court then reaffirmed the notion that due process was pri-
marily designed to protect against arbitrary government action. 10 3 To
that end, the Court was careful to make a distinction between chal-
lenges against the government in its executive-as opposed to its
legislative-capacity, stating that when dealing with executive action
"only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbi-
trary' in the constitutional sense."' 04 Relying on precedent beginning
with Rochin v. California,l05 the Court stated that government action
is only arbitrary in a constitutional sense when it reaches the level of
being conscience-shocking. 10 6 Seriously concerned with the prospect
of constitutional law becoming a "font of tort law," the Court stated
that "the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state
officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically be-
neath the threshold of constitutional due process."'
10 7
The Court recognized, however, that in some circumstances
something less than conscience-shocking government conduct may
be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 8 Specifically, the
Court previously held that a prison official's deliberate indifference
to the medical needs of prisoners constituted a due process viola-
tion.0 9 Additionally, the Court held that a municipality's failure to
train an employee who caused harm to an individual through uncon-
stitutional conduct should be measured by a deliberate indifference
standard." 0 The Court concluded that the "[r]ules of due process are
not.., subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory," and
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1716.
104. Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
105. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
106. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
107. Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1718.
108. See id.
109. See id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
110. See id. at 1718 n.10 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89
(1989)).
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explained that deliberate indifference or reckless disregard which
shocks in one environment may not be so egregious in another.
11
In looking at the present case, the Court first stated that "[a]s the
very term 'deliberate indifference' implies, the standard is sensibly
employed only when actual deliberation is practical .... 1912 Ac-
cordingly, the Court questioned whether this standard should even be
applied to high-speed pursuit cases. Nevertheless, the Court as-
sumed that it should and then looked for instruction from prison riot
cases, where the Court held that deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard for prison inmates was not constitutionally shocking.
113
The Court found that prison disturbances present "very real threats"
to the prison officials and other inmates, requiring necessary and
critical decisions to be made in extreme frenzy and haste." 4 In this
situation, the Court felt that the deliberate indifference standard
failed to adequately capture important competing interests, which are
always so clear in hindsight and critical analysis." 5 Accordingly, in
Whitley v. Albers," 6 the Court held that a standard much higher than
deliberate indifference must be satisfied to hold the prison official li-
able in such circumstances.
117
Analogizing the prison official's conduct in a prison riot to that
of a police officer's conduct in a high-speed pursuit, the Court stated:
Like prison officials facing a riot, the police on an occasion
calling for fast action have obligations that tend to tug
against each other. Their duty is to restore and maintain
lawful order, while not exacerbating disorder more than
necessary to do their job . . . . [Accordingly,] a much
higher standard of fault than deliberate indifference has to
be shown for officer liability."18
111. Id. at 1718.
112. Id. at 1719.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1719-20.
115. See id.
116. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
117. See id. (holding that where prison officials must decide on the use of
force to maintain prison order, in the face of very real threats from inmates, "a
deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of
such competing obligations").
118. Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1720.
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The Court reasoned that consideration for the split-second deci-
sions police officers must make in pursuing the interests of the state
to apprehend suspects-as balanced against the interests of individu-
als to remain free from injury caused by government officials--calls
for a finding of liability only where it is shown that the officer in-
tended the harm.119 The Court considered only this degree of egre-
gious behavior sufficient to shock the conscience and violate an indi-
vidual's due process rights.
In applying this standard to the Lewis II facts, the Court found
that "[w]hile prudence would have repressed the reaction, the offi-
cer's instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to
induce [the riders'] lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or
kill."'120 The Court then concluded that this conduct did not shock
the conscience and, accordingly, reversed the Ninth Circuit holding.
IV. ANALYSIS
"[O]ur constitutionalism possesses a viable system of funda-
mental rights insofar as it can protect the conditions for the flourish-
ing of individual persons against competing claims that may enjoy
majority support and may also plausibly be said to rest on recognized
public rights (that is, governmental powers).'
121
The need to have reactive police who are able to intercept crimi-
nal activity before it escalates to prohibitively dangerous levels is in-
deed great. However, it cannot be denied that an individual's right to
be free from arbitrary government action is critical. American his-
tory is full of illustrations defining this dichotomy; solid traditions
have stressed the importance of protecting the individual. However,
the Lewis II Court clearly chose to protect law enforcement officials
while abandoning the rights of the innocent citizen.
122
119. See id. at 1720. Compare Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir.
1986), in which the court stated that "[w]here a citizen suffers physical injury
due to a police officer's negligent use of his vehicle, no § 1983 claim is stated.
It is a different story when a citizen suffers or is seriously threatened with
physical injury due to a police officer's intentional misuse of his vehicle."
(quoted in Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1720 n.13).
120. Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1721.
121. DANIELN. HOFFMAN, OURELUSIVE CONSTITUTION 190 (1997).
122. See Barbara Dority, More Power, Less Responsibility; U.S. Supreme
Court Ruling Expands Police Powers and Decreases Accountability, THE
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A. What Are We Dealing With?
Police pursuit officer liability is a highly emotional topic that
engages heated debate on both sides of the issue. 123 Individuals
clearly have differing views on what the primary role of the police
should be. 124 Some believe that the police have a primary duty to
apprehend criminals; accordingly, these people advocate for broad
police discretion. 125 Others feel that the police too often abuse their
discretion and therefore need to be restrained.
26
In addition to varying public sentiment, a number of judicial
trends appear to be affecting recent Supreme Court decisions relating
to police liability for citizen injuries. 127 In particular, the Court has
shown a reluctance to extend substantive due process rights into new
areas, 128 an inclination to grant police more numerous and pervasive
powers, 129 and a tendency to require less police accountability.
130
These recent trends, which generally afford less protection to indi-
viduals, occur against a backdrop of a long judicial history
HUMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 3.
123. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., The Constitutional Implications of High-
Speed Police Pursuits Under a Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward
Through the Haze, 27 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 599, 606 (1997).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Dority, supra note 122.
128. Emphasis on this reluctance is evidenced in the Supreme Court's and
lower federal courts' application of more deferential standards to cases in-
volving state action. Specifically, the courts impose more stringent "state of
mind" requirements by distinguishing between government action and gov-
ernment inaction. Consequently, the courts are denying due process claims
where government inaction could be labeled arbitrary and capricious, and are
clarifying that where the government misconduct implicates a specifically
protected right, the more general substantive due process claim will not be
heard. See Levinson, supra note 31, at 332-43.
129. See Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 204 (1986):
For us to hold as a matter of constitutional law that police officers are
foreclosed from pursuing traffic offenders who disregard their direc-
tives to pull over would encourage violators to flee. Moreover, to
strip police officers of the authority to pursue traffic violators would
not only severely hamper the effective enforcement of the traffic laws,
it would also encourage offenders sought to be stopped for traffic of-
fenses, but guilty of more serious crimes, to flee.
Id.
130. See supra note 69.
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recognizing the importance of shielding individuals from govern-
mental abuse and arbitrary action. It is the nature of our legal system
that values deemed to be fundamental, as compared to those only
considered ordinary, are wholly dependent on the sitting Justices and
current national and worldwide events.
131
One cannot underestimate the importance of protecting one's
right to life against arbitrary governmental deprivation. Police pur-
suits often require officers to make split-second decisions, 132 but it
does not necessarily follow that all such decisions are without delib-
eration. For example, one set of police patrol guidelines directs offi-
cers to "approach each intersection with extreme caution, slowing
down to avoid an accident with someone who may not hear or heed
the warning siren and the approaching police car," and warns that
"there may be a time when it is strategically sound judgment to
abandon the pursuit."'
133
Despite such guidelines, statistics from twelve southern Califor-
nia police departments 134 indicate that 1957 pursuits occurred in
1995 alone. 135 The vast majority of these pursuits were initiated
following relatively minor traffic violations. 136 Approximately
eleven percent of these pursuits lasted ten minutes or longer.
137
131. "As Learned Hand famously warned us, judicial enforcement of rights
cannot guarantee public understanding and support for those rights. Rights
may be eroded by public indifference, organized resistance, transformative
court appointments, and so forth." HOFFMAN, supra note 121, at 189.
132. See Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1720.
133. THOMAS F. ADAMS, POLICE PATROL: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 238
(1971).
134. These include Bakersfield Police Department, San Bernardino Police
Department, Anaheim Police Department, Santa Ana Police Department, Long
Beach Police Department, Kern County Sheriff s Department, San Bernardino
County Sheriff's Department, Riverside Police Department, Orange County
Sheriffs Department, Riverside County Sheriffs Department, Los Angeles
County Sheriffs Department, and Los Angeles Police Department. See
AMERICAN CIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
NOT JUST ISOLATED INCIDENTS: THE EPIDEMIC OF POLICE PURSUITS IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 4 (June 1996) [hereinafter ACLU].
135. Seeid. at5.
136. See id. at 9. Minor traffic offenses include, among others, railroad
crossing violations, stop sign violations, and speeding. See id.
137. See id. at tbl. 1-5.
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Further, 638 suspects and 299 "other' 138 individuals were injured
during these pursuits. 139 The ACLU specifically noted that "[t]here
is an imbalance between the dangerous nature of pursuits and the se-
riousness of offenses charged at the conclusion of pursuits."'140 In
particular, no more than thirteen percent of the pursuits involved in-
dividuals suspected of committing a serious violent crime. 141
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1998 Lewis II decision, there were
three potential modes of analysis for determining officer liability in
police pursuit cases. Early on, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts rejected the notion that negligent conduct was sufficient to
make a due process challenge. 142 This produced a debate regarding
which of the two remaining standards of conduct-deliberate indif-
ference or reckless disregard and shocks the conscience-would suf-
fice for a due process violation; the circuit courts reached varying
conclusions.
B. The Pre-Lewis Circuit Court Split
1. "Shocks the conscience"
Although the shocks the conscience standard was first intro-
duced in the Supreme Court's decision in Rochin v. California,143 the
most frequently cited case in support of applying this standard in the
context of police pursuits was the Third Circuit decision of Fagan v.
138. "Other" refers to those individuals who were occupants other than the
driver-suspect of a pursued vehicle, occupants of other vehicles in the path of
the pursuit, and bystanders. See id. at 3.
139. See id. at tbl. 1-1. The Los Angeles Police Department unequivocally
holds the lead in the number of suspects and other individuals injured during a
pursuit. Two hundred and ninety-nine suspects were injured of the 638 total
number of suspects injured, and 165 other individuals of the total 299 other in-
dividuals were injured during pursuit. See id. at tbl. 1-1.
140. Id. at 16.
141. See id.
142. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (stating that "the
Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official
causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property"). See also Da-
vidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (holding that negligence by a prison
official that resulted in an inmate being assaulted by another inmate did not
constitute a due process violation).
143. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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City of Vineland (Fagan II).144 In Fagan II, the plaintiffs' decedents
were killed after being hit by a fleeing suspect's vehicle.
145 Al-
though the majority of the court held that the reckless disregard stan-
dard was most appropriate, 146 upon a rehearing en banc, the court
determined that in the context of police pursuits, the shocks the con-
science test should be applied instead.1
47
The court came to this conclusion by relying heavily on Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 48 where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
viability of the shocks the conscience standard in the context of sub-
stantive due process.' 49 Although Collins involved a governmental
omission, not a police pursuit, the Third Circuit specifically rejected
the notion that Collins should be limited to its facts. 150 Instead, the
court expanded Collins to apply to both government omissions and
affirmative acts. Consequently, it held that the shocks the conscience
standard was appropriately applied to police pursuits.15 ' The court
found support for this holding in other court of appeals cases where
the shocks the conscience standard was applied to challenges in-
volving affirmative government conduct.
152
144. 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane). Note that there are two Fagan
decisions: Fagan v. City of Vineland [Fagan 1], 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1994),
and Fagan v. City of Vineland [Fagan I1], 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994), an en
bane opinion in which the court considered only the applicability of the shocks
the conscience standard to an officer's individual liability.
145. See Fagan 11, 22 F.3d at 1300.
146. See id. at 1302.
147. See id. at 1308-09.
148. 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (denying relief to a plaintiff who sued the city un-
der § 1983 for injuries resulting from a failure to train about known dangers in
the workplace).
149. See Fagan 11, 22 F.3d at 1304.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1308-09.
152. See id. at 1305. The court cited to a number of cases, including Fe-
liciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 657 (6th Cir.) (involving subjecting
police academy cadets to surprise urinalysis in order to detect drugs), cert. de-
nied, 510 U.S. 826 (1993); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 302-03, 309 (5th
Cir. 1992) (involving county sheriffs replacement of trained SWAT and hos-
tage negotiation teams with untrained police officers, resulting in death of
hostage); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1483, 1486 (1lth
Cir. 1992) (involving police officials' retaliation against officers for whistle-
blowing about wrongdoing in the police department), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
987 (1993).
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Under somewhat similar factual circumstances, the First Circuit,
in Evans v. Avery,15 3 also endorsed the application of the shocks the
conscience standard in the police pursuit context. This decision rep-
resented an abandonment of the long-standing application of the de-
liberate indifference or reckless disregard standard. Relying on
Collins, the court concluded that the shocks the conscience test was
appropriately applied in the police pursuit context noting that
"[p]olice chases are not only a necessary concomitant of maintaining
order in our modem society, but they are also inherently hazard-
ous."'1 4 The court reasoned that applying any less stringent standard
would detrimentally "hamstring" the police in carrying out their du-
ties.
55
The Fourth Circuit had likewise adopted the shocks the con-
science standard in the police pursuit context. In Temkin v. Freder-
ick County Commissioners, 15 6 the plaintiff was severely injured when
both the fleeing suspect's and the pursuing police vehicles hit her.
The chase occurred on a narrow two-lane road, with cars parked on
both sides of the street. The vehicles reached speeds of 105 miles
per hour. The police vehicle was in such close pursuit that it was un-
able to stop before colliding with the plaintiff s vehicle.1
5 7
In reviewing the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, the court affirmed the
appellate court dismissal of the plaintiffs claim and held that the of-
ficer's conduct did not "shock the judicial conscience."' 158 Although
the court recognized that other circuits applied standards ranging
from "gross negligence" to "recklessness" in § 1983 actions not in-
volving police pursuits, the court reasoned that when prior police
pursuit cases 59 were considered together with both the shocks the
153. 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1210 (1997).
There, ten-year-old Marie Evans was struck and killed by a vehicle fleeing
from the police as she attempted to cross the street. See id. at 1035.
154. Id. at 1038.
155. See id.
156. 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.'1991).
157. See id. at718.
158. Id. at 723.
159. The court referenced four particular cases. In Roach v. City of
Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989), the plaintiffs alleged that their
substantive due process rights were violated when they were injured in an auto
accident with a fleeing suspect. See id. at 295-96. The court dismissed the
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)-which allows for
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conscience test and the "stricter standard" rationale espoused many
times by the Supreme Court, the only plausible conclusion was that
the shocks the conscience standard should be applied in the police
pursuit context.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit also applied the shocks the conscience
standard in police pursuit cases. In Checki v. Webb, 160 an officer in
an unmarked police vehicle followed a civilian for approximately
twenty miles without identifying himself as a law enforcement
agent. 161 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the case, stating that "where a police officer uses a police vehicle to
terrorize a civilian, and he has done so with malicious abuse of offi-
cial power shocking to the conscience, a court may conclude that the
officers have crossed the 'constitutional line."",
162
dismissal where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted-and concluded that negligent or grossly negligent conduct was insuf-
ficient to state a claim under § 1983. See id. at 297.
In Parton v. City of Bentonville, 901 F. Supp. 1440 (W.D. Ark. 1995), a
later case within the same circuit, the court concluded that the shocks the con-
science standard should be applied in due process cases:
As the Eighth Circuit has not determined the precise level of culpabil-
ity that must be shown to prevail on a substantive due process claim,
this court now holds that, where innocent civilians are injured in a car
accident caused by a high speed police chase, or by any other state
actor who is acting in the line of duty and in contravention of the rules
of the road, the injured civilian states a due process claim only if the
alleged misconduct "shocks the conscience."
Id. at 1443.
In Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (1 1th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff's dece-
dent was killed when she was hit by a pursuing police vehicle. Relying on
precedent set in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), and recognizing the Supreme Court's concern with respect to
the expansion of due process law, the court ruled that "negligent, or even
grossly negligent, operation of a motor vehicle by a policeman acting in the
line of duty has no § 1983 cause of action for violation of a federal right," be-
cause these injuries are more suitably redressed under state law. Cannon, 782
F.2d at 950.
The Sixth Circuit, in Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987), and
the Fifth Circuit. in Walton v. Salter, 547 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976), both dis-
missed due process claims involving police pursuit cases by concluding that
merely negligent conduct was not constitutionally culpable under § 1983.
160. 785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1986).
161. See id. at 535.
162. Id. at 538.
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Although not all circuit courts had addressed police pursuit due
process claims, it appears that all but four circuits had or would have
adopted the shocks the conscience standard in this context. 163 The
remaining four circuits applied the deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard standards.164
2. "Deliberate indifference" or "reckless disregard"
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 500,
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard exists when a person
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his
duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physi-
cal harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.'
65
The case most frequently mentioned in support of the deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard standard was Medina v. City and
County of Denver,166 decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Medina, a bystander sued under § 1983 after being struck by a
fleeing motorist who had been closely pursued by police. 167 The by-
stander alleged that the police pursuit constituted conduct that was
reckless and indifferent to the potential harm that could result from
the chase. 168 Although the circuit court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the claim, the court found that recklessness was suffi-
cient to state a claim under § 1983.169 The court clearly pointed out,
however, that conduct in reckless disregard of a known risk to the
163. Circuits that appear to adopt this standard include the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. See supra note 91.
164. Those Circuits include the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
See supra note 91.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Under the Model
Penal Code, recklessness is defined as the conscious disregard of "a substantial
and unjustifiable risk." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
166. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
167. See id. at 1494.
168. See id. at 1496.
169. See id.
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public at large was not sufficient to state a claim.170 Instead, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was in some way
directed toward the plaintiff.171 This can be established by proving
that the plaintiff was "closely and immediately tied to the perceived
substantial risk.'
172
Although the Tenth Circuit's more recent decision in Williams v.
City and County of Denver173 shed some doubt on whether the delib-
erate indifference or reckless disregard standard would continue to
be applied to police pursuit cases, 174 the Medina opinion continued to
carry great significance due to the specific test developed for appli-
cation in the police pursuit context.
175
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits likewise adopted the deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard standard. In the Sixth Circuit
opinion in Spears v. City of Louisville,176 the court reviewed Nishi-
yama v. Dickson County, Tenn.,177 where the court stated that "to
state a claim against state officials for a due process violation under §
1983, a plaintiff must show that the officials acted unreasonably and
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
174. In a non-pursuit situation, the court declined to follow the deliberate in-
difference or reckless disregard standard, and instead held that "a plaintiff must
do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused
injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power. That is, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of po-
tential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking." Id. at 1015.
175. The Medina court stated that to aid in the determination of whether an
officer's conduct can be considered sufficiently directed towards a third party,
the following factors should be analyzed: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member
of a limited and specifically definable group, (2) whether the defendant's con-
duct specifically put that group of people at substantial risk of serious, imme-
diate and proximate harm, (3) whether the risk was obvious or known, and (4)
whether the defendant acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk. See
Medina, 960 F.2d at 1496.
176. 27 F.3d 567, No. 93-5921, 1994 WL 262054 (6th Cir. June 14, 1994).
Spears involved a situation where a motorcyclist being pursued by the police
was killed when the motorcycle collided with a truck. See id. at * 1. The father
of the motorcyclist brought a § 1983 action against the police department al-
leging a violation of his son's substantive due process rights. See id.
177. 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (police pursuit ending in death
of innocent third party).
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intentionally with disregard of a known risk."' 78 The Spears court
found these statements controlling and continued to apply the reck-
less disregard standard. And in Magdziak v. Byrd,1 79 it appeared that
the Seventh Circuit would also apply the reckless disregard stan-
dard.180 There, a bystander was killed in an accident that occurred
during an officer's high-speed pursuit of a suspect. 181  The de-
ceased's estate alleged that the officer's failure to activate his lights
or sirens constituted culpable conduct.182 Nonetheless, the court de-
termined that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity as other
cases indicated that the officer had not violated any clearly estab-
lished constitutional right.1
83
The Ninth Circuit clearly advocated the deliberate indifference
or reckless disregard standard as being more appropriate than the
shocks the conscience test. 84 The court was first confronted with
this question in L. W. v. Grubbs (Grubbs fl).18" Grubbs II involved a
non-pursuit case where a prison inmate attempted to rape and assault
the plaintiff, a registered nurse at the correctional facility. 86 The
178. Spears, 1994 WL 262054, at *2 (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson County,
814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
179. 96 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996).
180. The likelihood of extending the reckless indifference standard to the
police pursuit context was further illustrated in Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418 (7th
Cir. 1996), a non-pursuit case where the court held that
[f]or a defendant to be reckless in a constitutional sense, he must be
criminally reckless .... [I]t is not enough to show that a state actor
should have known of the danger his actions created. Rather, a plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of im-
pending harm which he consciously refused to prevent.
Id. at 421. The court's statement clearly represented a rejection of the mere
negligence standard but strongly suggested that liability will be imposed for
conduct which is deliberately indifferent, or criminally reckless.
181. SeeMagdziak, 96 F.3d at 1046.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1048. The defense of qualified immunity protects govern-
ment officials from liability where 'their conduct does not violate clearly es-
tablished... rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' Id. at
1047 (quoting Behrens v. Peletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996)).
184. See supra Part III.C.
185. 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996). Note that there are two Grubbs decisions:
L. W. v. Grubbs [Grubbs 1], 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), and L. W. v. Grubbs
[Grubbs 11], 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
186. See Grubbs II, 92 F.3d at 895-96.
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plaintiff filed a § 1983 action claiming that her due process rights
were violated by the institution's failure to protect her from a known
danger. 187 The defendant subsequently appealed the plaintiffs fa-
vorable verdict.1
8 8
In determining the appropriate standard of culpability, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
This Court has been consistent on at least one point: We
have not deviated from the principle that deliberate indif-
ference on the part of the responsible official, to the safety
of employees in the presence of known danger, created by
official conduct, is sufficient to establish a due process
violation.
189
Accordingly, the court rejected the notion that negligence alone
was sufficient to state a § 1983 cause of action. The court did not re-
quire, however, that the government official's conduct shock the
conscience. In an attempt to define deliberately indifferent conduct,
the court endorsed the First Circuit's explanation: "'While this
mental state can aptly be described as "recklessness," it is reckless-
ness not in the tort-law sense but in the appreciably stricter criminal-
law sense, requiring actual knowledge [or wilful [sic] blindness] of
impending harm, easily preventable."" 190  This case provided the
Ninth Circuit with strong support for maintaining an advocacy of the
reckless indifference standard in subsequent police pursuit cases.
191
Although the Eleventh Circuit appeared to have adopted the
shocks the conscience test in the police pursuit context, 192 its rejec-
tion of this standard in the more recent McKinney v. Pate'93 decision,
albeit a non-pursuit case, suggests that the circuit may have found the
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard standard to be more ap-
propriate.
194
187. See Grubbs I, 974 F.2d at 120.
188. See Grubbs II, 92 F.3d at 895.
189. Id. at 896 (citing Grubbs I, 974 F.2d at 122-23; Wood v. Ostrander, 879
F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989)).
190. Id. at 899-900 (alteration in original) (quoting Manarite v. City of
Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992)).
191. See supra Part III.C.
192. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
193. 20F.3d 1550 (llthCir. 1994).
194. See id. at 1556 n.7.
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C. Appropriateness of the Reckless Indifference Standard
"A recklessness standard affords an appropriate level of deter-
rence without unduly burdening local governments or the federal
courts with having to respond to and manage an onslaught of what
are essentially common law tort cases."'
195
1. The deliberate indifference or reckless disregard standard
complements the goals of substantive due process
It is traditionally understood that substantive due process is de-
signed to protect individuals from government action in both its leg-
islative and executive capacities. 96 However, the Lewis II Court was
clear in emphasizing that standards of liability depend upon which
branch of government is engaged in the action.' 97 This distinction
can be justified by the underlying principle that substantive due pro-
cess is most appropriately applied when used to protect the individ-
ual against systematic governmental invasion.19  This principle is
buttressed by the Court's concern that constitutional law may be-
come a font of tort law if due process rights are expanded too far. 99
195. Brief for Respondents at 16-17, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.
Ct. 1708 (1998) (No. 96-1337).
196. See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 10, at 93-95. See also Lewis II,
118 S. Ct. at 1724 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1716.
198. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judi-
cial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327 (1993)
("Increasingly, due process law aims less to correct individual injustices than
to structure and maintain a regime in which courts ensure that governmental
lawbreaking does not reach intolerable levels; this latter ambition is more
clearly implicated in challenges to rules and legislation than in individual tort
actions.") (footnotes omitted).
199. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1718. See also Fallon, supra note 198, at 365
("Acknowledging the impracticality of aspiring to correct every individual in-
justice, due process frequently satisfies itself with efforts to promote the so-
cially tolerable systemic effects."); J. Michael McGuinness & Lisa A.
McGuinness Parlagreco, The Reemergence of Substantive Due Process as a
Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof and Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1129,
1152 (1989) ("While a single incident may certainly suffice to shock the con-
science, perhaps the test is more appropriately applied to a course of govern-
mental conduct."); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional
in Constitutional Torts, 72 CEI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 690 (1997) ("[W]hat is
special about constitutional law, and distinguishes it from tort, is its concern
with institutional power, and therefore with systemic injustice.") (footnote
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This distinction results in different standards of review being applied
to executive and legislative action. In cases dealing with abusive ex-
ecutive conduct, the Court has repeatedly held that only the most
egregious behavior will be considered a constitutional violation. 0 0
Although the Court's concern is valid and deeply rooted, it fails
to maintain sight of the forest for the trees: injuries resulting from
high-speed police pursuits are not isolated and individual situations.
Although they involve individual people and individual officers, po-
lice pursuits represent a systematic approach to policing that too of-
ten needlessly endangers the lives of right-deserving suspects and,
more unfortunately, unwitting bystanders. °2 0 Obviously the need for
police to maintain a peaceful society is overwhelming, and it is not at
all suggested by this Note that these kinds of pursuits should not
continue. However, it is not unreasonable to recognize that just as
the notion of police pursuits is a systematic means to achieving a
systematic goal-apprehension of lawbreakers-the adverse conse-
quences of these pursuits pose a systematic danger, requiring that
such exercises of governmental power be restrained.
Additionally, the Court undermines its own focus on systematic
invasions when it pronounces that liability is dependent on the indi-
vidual's state of mind.20 2 In fact, as some commentators have em-
phasized:
Certain intrusive practices that threaten personal injury or
personal dignity... might be quite consistent with an offi-
cal's honest effort to do the job efficiently and effectively.
An official's neutral, or even admirable, mental state ought
not, in itself, be an insurmountable barrier to the claim that
the Constitution has been violated.20 3
More specifically, a finding of a constitutional violation should
not require a showing that the officer intended to harm the victim.
Rather, such findings should be permitted regardless of any sort of
intent. Indeed, the Court would have been more consistent with its
omitted).
200. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
202. See Lewis I, 118 S. Ct. at 1720.
203. Whitman, supra note 199, at 686.
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own rationale if it instead required an analysis of the institutional
choices beyond the intent of the individual officer.
20 4
In particular, if the goal of substantive due process is only to
remedy systematic invasions, there is no point in looking at an indi-
vidual's state of mind because the individual does not properly repre-
sent the systematic structure of law enforcement. The fact that high-
speed pursuits are a commonplace tool of law enforcement clearly
implicates a systematic structure that could be analyzed according to
its policy and apart from the circumstances of the individual case.2
°5
Although it is certainly possible that high-speed pursuit trage-
dies are the product of an individual officer's judgment, these deci-
sions are more largely encompassed by the overreaching policy re-
garding the activity. If too many pursuits end up in needless injuries
to either suspects or bystanders, the policy must be flawed in some
way-regardless of how it measures up to state guidelines-which
then deserves closer analysis and reconsideration.
An illustration from the City of Baltimore exemplifies this
point. The Baltimore police department had long rejected the
proposition that injury and death resulting from police pursuits were
necessary consequences of effective law enforcement. 20 7 Instead, the
department enforced a policy that strictly limited a police officer's
ability to initiate pursuit.2°1 According to a police department
spokesperson, results from implementing the stricter policy were ex-
cellent.20 9 The spokesperson made reference to the utility of new
communications technology that allowed police to apprehend crimi-
nals without creating dangerous situations through pursuit.210
204. See The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 122, 200 (1998).
205. See Whitman, supra note 199, at 691.
206. See Frank Kuznik, Macho Mayhem, WASH. POST, May 19, 1991, at
W20.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. "'We still give out plenty of moving violation tickets and catch
our suspects just like everybody else-we just don't chase them at high speeds
through the city."' Id. (quoting the spokesperson).
210. See id. The Baltimore policy included radioing to the dispatcher when
a suspected criminal was located and requesting a road block. This practice
enables a virtually guaranteed apprehension, without endangering the public.
See id.
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Assuming the department policy is considered "sufficient"--
meaning it meets those guidelines instituted by the state-cities
would never be motivated to make the sort of aggressive changes
made by the City of Baltimore if officers could only be liable where
it is shown that they intended to harm the victim. It is plausible for
there to exist a "sufficient" department policy, with an officer who
has no intent to harm, and there may still be a constitutional
violation. As such, "there should be mechanisms for articulating and
reinforcing constitutional limits on government behavior that do not
depend on the existence of a 'bad actor' with a malicious state of
mind."
211
2. The deliberate indifference or reckless disregard standard
provides a sufficient degree of deterrence
The Supreme Court has continually rejected arguments that
mere negligence constitutes culpable conduct under the Fourteenth
Amendment-and rightfully so. In Daniels v. Williams 212 and Da-
vidson v. Cannon,213 the Court thoughtfully explained why merely
negligent acts do not rise to the level of conduct that the Due Process
Clause was designed to remedy. Specifically, the Court reasoned
that in order for there to be a deprivation of constitutional propor-
tions, the plaintiff must show there was "an affirmative abuse of
power., 214 In both cases, the Court concluded that the government
conduct did not rise to this level.
Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the notion that plaintiffs
should not be able to bring constitutional claims against government
officials for injuries resulting from conduct that was not uniquely
211. Whitman, supra note 199, at 690.
212. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In Daniels, an inmate slipped on a pillow which a
deputy sheriff had negligently left on a stairway. See id. at 328. The inmate
brought a § 1983 action in federal court claiming that the sheriff had deprived
him of his interest in being free from bodily injury. See Daniels v. Williams,
720 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, 748 F.2d 229 (1984) (en
banc).
213. 474 U.S. 344 (1986). In Davidson, a prisoner was attacked by another
inmate after notifying prison officials that this inmate had threatened him with
physical force. See id. at 345-46. The prisoner argued that the officers' failure
to take any reasonable steps to prevent the injury constituted a violation of due
process. See id. at 346.
214. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-
49 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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governmental. Accordingly, in Daniels, the Court appropriately re-
jected a due process claim for injury to a prisoner resulting from a
negligently placed pillow because the pillow could have been placed
there not only by a deputy sheriff, but also by a housekeeper, another
inmate, or a myriad of other people. More precisely, the act of neg-
ligently placing the pillow did not represent a uniquely governmental
act.
2 15
Importantly, the present scenario is distinguishable from the
Daniels case in one crucial respect. Here, only the government has
the authority to initiate and maintain a high-speed pursuit.216 While
it is possible for an ordinary citizen to drive erratically and at high-
speeds, state tort law provides a sufficient remedy for these situa-
tions. In contrast, when there is a police officer behind the wheel of
the pursuing vehicle, the dynamics of the situation shift dramatically.
Government presence often has, to say the least, an intimidating ef-
fect on almost everyone around. For example, where an ordinary
citizen driving in a fast and erratic manner may prompt other drivers
to move aside, a police-driven patrol car may cause the pursued indi-
vidual to make irrational driving choices, often regardless of the al-
leged violation.217 In this way, the vehicle altercation resulting from
a police pursuit is "uniquely governmental" in that its effect is tre-
mendously different from the seemingly similar altercation involving
an ordinary citizen.218 Accordingly, whenever an officer decides to
initiate a pursuit against what is likely to be considered more prudent
judgment, an abuse of power has occurred.2 19
215. See id. at 332-33.
216. As Judge Cowen points out in his dissent in Fagan, "[i]n pursuing
fleeing suspects, police offices [sic] are engaged in an activity that is uniquely
governmental in nature .... This is governmental conduct which private citi-
zens generally cannot engage in." Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296,
1322 (3d Cir. 1994).
217. The vast majority of police pursuits are the result of a routine traffic
stop gone awry. See ACLU, supra note 134, at 9.
218. The Supreme Court's and other lower federal courts' conclusion that an
auto accident involving a government official does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, is not persuasive here. In dicta, the Parratt Court
merely reiterated that injuries which could be caused by any citizen, and which
are not unique to governmental power, are not actionable injuries. See Parratt,
451 U.S. at 544.
219. Despite the Lewis II Court's focus on the officer's intent, "[tihe good
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In Lewis II, the Court found the deliberate indifference or reck-
less disregard standard220 inappropriate in the police pursuit context
by reasoning that the split-second decisions officers are required to
make in such circumstances leave no time for deliberation.221 Ac-
cordingly, one cannot be found to be deliberately indifferent where
there was no opportunity to deliberate. However, if we accept the
idea that substantive due process is designed to redress systematic,
institutional wrongs, one can hardly argue that injuries resulting from
police pursuits are unforeseen circumstances; statistics clearly illus-
trate that such injury is something which can be anticipated.222
The reckless disregard standard not only provides significant
deterrence, but courts can also easily apply it. The value of choosing
the reckless disregard standard is supported by a history of precedent
involving judicial interpretation of its parameters in case law.223 As
compared to the shocks the conscience standard, where "the measure
of what is conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard stick,"224 the
reckless disregard standard is clearly defined.
3. Flaws with the shocks the conscience test
"[A] 'shocks the conscience' test spurns bright lines. It spurns
rules. It is a vague standard... inviting all decisionmakers to con-
sult their sensibilities rather than objective circumstances."
225
One widely held criticism of the Lewis II Court's ruling is that
the shocks the conscience standard is "too subjective and vague to
provide any... [meaningful] guidance for lower federal courts. 226
In fact, both Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions have
faith of the official seems more relevant to the question of whether he or she
should be personally held liable for damages... than to whether the Constitu-
tion has been infringed." Whitman, supra note 199, at 686.
220. For clarification, the terms "reckless disregard" and "deliberate indif-
ference" are used interchangeably to refer to the same standard of culpability.
221. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1719.
222. See ACLU, supra note 134, at 9 (five of the twelve departments studied
had a consistently large number of high-speed pursuit collisions, "defined as in
excess of 30%").
223. See Edlund, supra note 38, at 212.
224. Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1717.
225. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring).
226. Edlund, supra note 38, at 207.
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acknowledged the ambiguous nature of this test.227 Contrary to an
objective standard, the shocks the conscience standard "make[s] the
rule turn not on the Constitution but on the -idiosyncrasies of the
judges who [preside]. ' 228 In the end, an individual's ability to evalu-
ate his or her claim involves nothing but guesswork as it is impossi-
ble to tell just how egregious the conduct must be in order to have a
claim worth fighting for.
22 9
In justifying the application of a shocks the conscience test, the
Supreme Court relied heavily on the benchmark created in Rochin v.
California.230 There, the Court held that a due process violation is
established where the executive conduct shocks the conscience.
231
However, the Court's heavy reliance on Rochin and its progeny is
questionable.
Some commentators argue that looking to Rochin for any guid-
ance in the police-pursuit context is "misplaced. 232 They contend
that an accurate analogy between Rochin and Lewis II cannot be
made due to the drastically different facts. As previously stated,
227. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. 1717 ("[T]he measure of what is conscience
shocking is no calibrated yard stick.... ."); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175 (Black, J.,
concurring) (describing the shocks the conscience test as being a "nebulous
standard"); Fagan H, 22 F.3d at 1308 ("[W]e are aware of the amorphous and
imprecise inquiry that the 'shocks the conscience' test entails .... "); Metcalf
v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D. Del. 1985) ("Such a 'vague and discre-
tionary' standard is not easily utilized.").
228. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
229. See Fagan II, 22 F.3d at 1320 (Cowen, J., dissenting). Commenting on
how the majority of the Court failed to define the shocks the conscience stan-
dard, Judge Cowen states that neither the Court nor the Defendants-the City
of Vineland--could imagine a police pursuit situation where this standard
would be satisfied. See id. at 1319. Moreover, "[i]t thus appears that the Con-
stitution does not constrain police officers when conducting a high-speed car
chase." Id. See also Brief for The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
[hereinafter ATLA Brief] at 11, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct.
1708 (1998)(No. 96-1337). ATLA looks to Temkin v. Frederick County
Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1991), to illustrate that where the court
concludes that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist under the facts of
that case, it is hard to see how this standard would ever be satisfied. See ATLA
Brief at 14-15 (No. 96-1337). For a discussion of the facts and holding in
Temkin, see supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
230. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
231. See id. at 172-73.
232. See Donald A. Dripps, Does Police Pursuit Shock the Conscience?,
TRIAL, Aug. 1998, at 66-67.
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Rochin involved a warrantless midnight entry, without probable
cause, which culminated in pumping the suspect's stomach to re-
trieve a narcotics capsule.233 To analogize these two cases is to mis-
understand the main issue in Rochin. Unlike the Lewis 11 case, Ro-
chin was not concerned with whether the police conduct itself
reached a level so egregious as to violate due process.234 Instead, the
main issue in Rochin was whether due process required the exclusion
of the evidence obtained under the Fourth Amendment, in addition to
damages for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
35
Third Circuit Court Judge Cowen's dissent2 36 in Fagan v. City of
Vineland237 illustrates the Supreme Court's error in its reliance on
Rochin. Judge Cowen questioned whether the Rochin shocks the-
conscience test was even exportable to the civil context.238 More-
over, he presented considerable support that even if it was, it had be-
come a dead letter.239 Nevertheless, assuming neither of these argu-
ments renders the Court's application of Rochin in police pursuit
cases fatal, Judge Cowen strongly argued that the court has mistak-
enly turned the shocks the conscience test into a "necessity test"
rather than maintaining it as the "sufficiency test" it was designed to
be.240 Judge Cowen argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Ro-
chin intended only to state that conduct which shocks the conscience
renders evidence inadmissible; "[i]t never held that only that kind of
conduct suffices or is required in order to exclude evidence." 241 This
distinction, therefore, militates against the adoption of the shocks the
conscience standard for any due process claim as this standard is not
233. See id. at 67.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Three other justices joined Judge Cowen's dissent: Justices Becker,
Scirica, and Lewis.
237. 22 F.3d 1296, 1309 (3d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Fagan I1, see supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
238. See Fagan., 22 F.3d at 1310 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 1311, 1316-18.
240. See id. at 1318. To elaborate, Judge Cowen asserts that the Rochin
Court never concluded that conscience-shocking conduct was required, or nec-
essary, to allege a due process violation. See id. Rather, the Court merely
concluded that conduct that shocks the conscience is certainly sufficient to state
such a claim. See id.
241. Id.
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meant to be a threshold requirement to a finding of liability. Rather,
conduct that can be labeled as conscience-shocking should be em-
phasized only to illustrate what may constitute a violation.
242
Indeed, lower federal court judges have recognized the necessity
for clarification of the shocks the conscience test. Specifically, in
Johnson v. Glick,243 Circuit Court Judge Friendly set forth a four-
factor test in an attempt to provide guidelines for what type of con-
duct would shock the conscience. 244 Despite this attempt to clear the
murky waters, lower courts continue to encounter difficulty in ap-
plying this test, as exemplified by their inconsistent conclusions.
245
Presenting an even more unnerving possibility, the Court's deci-
sion gives police unbridled discretion and authority without realizing
the ramifications of such a grant of power: "'You get a 25-year-old
person with his hot blood and adrenaline going, and even though we
train our people otherwise, he wants to chase."'2 46 A common result
is that an overzealous officer pursues whatever he can, ignoring the
innocent people that may get swept into his path.
The Lewis I Court suggested that plaintiffs would satisfy the
shocks the conscience standard only if they could prove that the offi-
cer intended to harm the victim. 247 It is unlikely that such an intent
to harm will ever be proven as it is impossible for a plaintiff to get
inside the officer's mind.248 Moreover, any circumstantial evidence
used to prove intent will more likely demonstrate the officer's intent
to carry out his law enforcement duties and will fall to illustrate his
actual intent with respect to the pursued suspect and other bystand-
ers. In the heat of the moment-when a suspect is fleeing, the
242. See id.
243. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
244. The four factors include:
[(1)] the need for the application of force, [(2)] the relationship be-
tween the need and the amount of force that was used, [(3)] the extent
of the injury inflicted, and [(4)] whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm.
Ad. at 1033.
245. See Edlund, supra note 38, at 207-08.
246. Kuznik, supra note 206, at W20.
247. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1718.
248. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Decision on Police Pursuit, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
20, 1998, at 3.
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officer's overhead lights are on and the sirens are blaring, and the of-
ficer has the power of the law behind him-it is at this point where
dangerous decisions may be made and horrible consequences may
result.
In response to the general concern of having constitutional law
become a font of tort law, the Court suggested that actions similar to
the Lewises' would be more appropriately brought under state tort
law.249 On its face, this solution may seem to solve the problem, but
the Court failed to look more closely to determine whether this rem-
edy would in reality redress the wrong. Section 1983 was enacted to
provide a remedy for constitutional deprivations. However, § 1983
only enforces already existing federally protected rights and fails to
create any new ones.2  Specifically, the enactment of this legisla-
tion signified Congress's intent to provide plaintiffs with access to
federal court to secure redress for wrongs that state courts did not
adequately address.2 5 1 Indeed, state court use of post-deprivation
procedures and immunity principles often denies plaintiffs any
meaningful avenue of recourse.2 5 2 Moreover, assuming a state court
does review a plaintiff's case, state tort recovery caps and limita-
tions253 often result in unsatisfactory compensation.
249. See Lewis II, 118 S. Ct. at 1721 n.14.
250. See Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit: Toward a Cate-
gorical Approach, 73 IND. L.J. 1277, 1283 (1998).
251. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1961).
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies.
Id. at 180.
252. See Jensen, supra note 250, at 1289-90.
253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-93-2 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04
(West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1998); TEx. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). Tradition-
ally, governmental immunity provided an incentive for people to enter public
service and perform their duties in good faith without fear of personal liability.
See Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
In exercising the functions of his office, [a government official],
keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an ap-
prehension that.., his official conduct may... become the subject of
1395
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1357
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis has ef-
fectively rendered plaintiffs with no means of recourse for their inju-
ries. Moreover, the Court handed down its controversial decision de-
spite extensive case law consistently applying the reckless disregard
or deliberate indifference standard, and criticizing the ambiguity of
the shocks the conscience test. This holding was primarily based on
what appears to be an over-inflated fear that such actions would
rapidly demote constitutional law to a font of tort law.
The Court's decision clearly fails to take into account the recur-
rent and systematic nature of the police pursuit problem by main-
tamining that any sort of restriction would hamper effective law en-
forcement efforts. The Lewis U1 decision is, indeed, an unfortunate
roadblock in plaintiffs' attempts to redress their constitutional
wrongs. Despite good faith efforts to interpret the shocks the con-
science test, the problem still remains that "some judges have dem-
onstrated that they are so inured to injuries caused by overzealous
policing that their consciences are virtually shockproof. ' 54 It is ob-
vious that in today's society, crimes are more violent, more egre-
gious and more outrageous than ever. Although this may be the case,
certain examples of conduct that may not shock one's particular con-
science should nonetheless be outlawed.255
Because the shocks the conscience standard is replete with so
many flaws, it seems illogical and unreasonable that the Court would
choose to adopt this standard instead of one with a long history of
consistent application and interpretation: the reckless disregard or
deliberate indifference standard. This standard is stringent enough to
protect government officials against liability for injuries caused by
ordinary, non-"uniquely governmental" acts so as to avoid turning
inquiry .... It would seriously cripple the proper and effective ad-
ministration of public affairs... if he were subjected to any such re-
straint.
Id. at 242 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)). State im-
posed caps on liability relate to the same underlying purpose and also release
taxpayers from any undue burden resulting from government negligence. See
Jensen, supra note 250, at 1290.
254. Michael Avery, Police Chases: More Deadly Than a Speeding Bullet?,
TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 52, 53.
255. See Dripps, supra note 232, at 67.
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constitutional law into a font of tort law. At the same time, it pro-
vides additional deterrence to officials who may forget or ignore the
rights of those they govern. One can only hope that the Court will
realize the ramifications of its holding before too many innocent
people are killed by officers who get carried away in the heat of the
chase.
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